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Abstract
This study attempts to increase the understanding of how different solutions to build alliance manage-
ment capability influence alliance performance. We propose that both reliance on the informal accu-
mulation of alliance experience (i.e., tacit alliance management knowledge, AMK) and articulation of
alliance know-how in the form of usable guidelines, checklists, or manuals (i.e., codified AMK) have
an inverted U-shaped influence on alliance performance. Additionally, we investigate the moderating
role of having the dedicated alliance function (DAF) on the curvilinear relationships between reliance
on AMK and performance. Based on a sample of 113 large firms involved in strategic alliances, we
find support for the inverted U-shaped relationship between reliance on tacit and codified AMK and al-
liance performance. Moreover, our results indicate that the DAF has a positive impact on the deploy-
ment of AMK. The DAF turns into improved performance when the reliance on experiential learning
and the codification of AMK are both limited. Moreover, the DAF also reduces the potential downside
effects of relying on higher levels of both types of AMK. Finally, DAF diversity, in terms of educational,
functional, and tenure heterogeneity of its members, emerges as relevant to achieve effective alliance
know-how collection and deployment for superior alliance performance.
JEL classification: L10, L21, L24
1. Introduction
In a fast changing and hypercompetitive world, alliances have become a key tool to access valuable and non-tradable
resources (Das and Teng, 2000) and an important source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and value
creation (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Notwithstanding the increasing need to rely on these inter-organizational part-
nerships to compete, alliances are complex to manage and fraught with risks. Empirical evidence shows that most of
them fail to live up to performance expectations (Koza and Lewin, 2000; Kale et al., 2001), and they can lead to de-
struction of shareholder value (Kale et al., 2002).
Moving from the strategic importance of these inter-firm collaborations, recent studies have increasingly focused
on the performance consequences of organizational arrangements that facilitate the accumulation and sharing of
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alliance management knowledge (AMK, hereafter) embedded in prior and ongoing alliance experience (Heimeriks
et al., 2009; Niesten and Jolink, 2015). A significant body of empirical research has stressed the positive impact of
relying on accumulated alliance experience and informal sharing of lessons learned, that is, tacit AMK (Heimeriks
and Duysters, 2007). Yet, the deployment of tacit AMK is a necessary but not sufficient condition to improve alliance
performance. Scholars have provided empirical evidence on the need to implement more proactive efforts to articu-
late tacitness into usable, codified objects, that is, codified AMK (Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). The use of such
codified tools is expected to support alliance decision-making in alliance transactions and improve performance
(Zollo and Winter, 2002; Ha˚kanson, 2007).
Despite converging on the potential gains of deploying tacit and codified AMK, recent research has started to ad-
dress the potential drawbacks of reliance on both types of knowledge (Kale and Singh, 2009; Wang and
Rajagopalan, 2015). In fact, excessive reliance on tacitness may result in inertial behavior and foster overconfidence
and superstitious learning phenomena (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Similarly, an increasing level of codification
may exhibit diminishing returns due to the fallacies of detachment, predetermination, and formalization (Heimeriks,
2010).
In an attempt to better handle the limits of reliance on tacit and codified AMK, dedicated alliance functions
(DAFs) are emerging across industries. Defined as that organizational unit directly responsible for coordinating
and monitoring the firm’s alliances, the DAF is purposefully created to manage complex learning processes, sup-
port the accumulation and deployment of alliance management know-how, identify, screen, and attract prospect-
ive alliance partners (Kale and Singh, 1999; Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). Research has already confirmed an
overall positive impact of establishing the DAF on alliance performance (Kale et al., 2002; Heimeriks et al.,
2009). Yet, evidence is still anecdotal on the moderating role of the DAF in the deployment of AMK for superior
performance.
Moving from the above theoretical arguments, we address the benefits and costs of deploying tacit and codi-
fied AMK. First, we suggest that the relationship between reliance on these types of knowledge and alliance per-
formance is not linear but may follow an inverted U-shape. Second, we argue that the contribution of reliance
on experiential learning and codification of alliance know-how to alliance performance is contingent on the ex-
istence of the DAF. Third, we explore and empirically test how specific attributes of the DAF, namely, its
educational, functional, and tenure diversity, affect the relationship between reliance on AMK and alliance
performance.
To test the hypotheses, we collected primary data in a sample of 113 large companies extensively involved in stra-
tegic alliances. Given the objectives of this study, a survey represented the most appropriate method to collect data
and information for the variable included in the analysis: the dependent variable (i.e., alliance performance), predic-
tors (i.e., tacit and codified AMK), and moderators (i.e., the presence of the DAF and its diversity) of the relationship
between predictors and the dependent variable.
Results provide support to the non-linearity hypotheses. Reliance on AMK exhibits a pattern of diminishing
returns, eventually reversing itself at high levels when companies may find themselves stuck in either experiential
learning traps or excessive codification (Heimeriks et al., 2007). By focusing on the distinct effects of reliance on
AMK and suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship, our study provides insights into the antecedents of alliance
success as it integrates and extends current perspectives on the benefits and limits of investing in learning processes to
build alliance capability. In this vein, we provide a knowledge-based explanation for the previously inverse U-rela-
tionship between the intensity to which firms engage in external collaborations and the returns they receive from this
engagement (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2016).
Moreover, results indicate that having the DAF improves alliance performance when the development of alli-
ance management capabilities to use AMK is still limited. The DAF also reduces the potential downside effects of
high reliance on both types of alliance knowledge. Evidence of the moderating role of the DAF is further extended
by disentangling the impact of a more or less diverse composition of its members, in terms of education, repre-
sented functions, and tenure. Results show that as diversity grows, it improves alliance performance consequences
of lower and higher reliance on both types of knowledge. By highlighting DAFs’ attributes as important contin-
gency factors, we answer the call for a better understanding of how to properly set up an alliance function
(Kale and Singh, 2009).
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2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Alliance management knowledge deployment and alliance success
2.1.1 The pros and cons of relying on tacit AMK
The past decades have witnessed growing evidence that firms accumulate AMK doing more of the same (i.e., experi-
ential knowledge without explicit knowledge codification), and therefore, tacitly developing alliance capability
(Anand and Khanna, 2000). This type of knowledge is defined as tacit because it originates as individual experiences
and perceptions (Ancori et al., 2000; Foss, 2003). Difficult to be formalized and articulated from practice, tacit
knowledge is processed into collective understandings, competencies, know-how, and routines (Spender, 1996;
Ha˚kanson, 2007; Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009).
A substantial number of studies have supported the concept that firms learn from the tacit accumulation of prior
alliance experience (Sampson, 2005; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2015) and benefit
from its deployment (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Anand and Khanna (2000), for instance, were among the first
to find that firms with greater experience in joint ventures learn to create more value and, therefore, generate higher
stock returns.
There are several reasons supporting the belief that the use of tacit AMK acquired through experience turns into
improved alliance performance (Russo and Vurro, 2010). First, firms with greater alliance experience improve
their alliance performance through learning-by-doing and trial and error processes. These processes are fundamental
to acquire experiential wisdom and create a portfolio of heuristics to guide the selection and retention of previous
behaviors by elaborating and leveraging on a repertoire of positive or negative feedbacks (Levitt and March, 1988;
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). Indeed, managers usually reinforce behaviors that
have shown positive outcomes, whereas diminishing the propensity to engage in actions and procedures that have led
to negative consequences.
Further, companies that have engaged in numerous alliances are more familiar with critical alliance issues and
processes (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007), making them more able to assess risks and improve alliance performance
(Sampson, 2005). Similarly, experienced managers are less prone to erroneously transfer processes and routines
(Nadolska and Barkema, 2014).
Finally, the accumulation of alliance experience over time and across domains stimulates conscious learning and
favors the emergence of a deliberate attitude to capture lessons learnt from earlier experiences (Simonin, 1997).
Therefore, firms leverage on higher alliance experience to develop more effective alliance management systems.
However, accumulating alliance experience does not increase alliance performance indefinitely (Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2006). Many studies have highlighted that although positive, the effect of the informal accumulation of ex-
perience has diminishing marginal returns (Draulans et al., 2003; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 2005).
Anand and Khanna (2000) find that experience accounts only for a limited proportion of alliance success. Kale et al.
(2001) highlight that the mere accumulation of tacit knowledge, which usually remains embedded into the minds of
individual managers (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998), is a necessary but not sufficient condition to fully explain superior al-
liance skills.
There are numerous reasons suggesting that there is a limit to learning-by-doing and alliance experience accumu-
lation (Nygaard and Russo, 2008). First, the development of routines from prior experience can lead to the reduction
of the spectrum of options analyzed and implemented by the firm (Levinthal and March, 1993; Hoang and
Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 2005). Second, the accumulation of previous success is likely to foster overconfidence
and superstitious learning phenomena, limiting the development of deeper action–outcome linkages (Levitt and
March, 1988; Zollo, 2009; Heimeriks, 2010). Third, the learning process takes place at an individual level and, thus,
alliance know-how is likely to be embedded in the minds of the single managers directly involved, limiting the diffu-
sion and further development of firm-wide alliance capabilities. In this regard, the beneficial impact of experiential
alliance knowledge relates to the extent to which best practices are transferred within corporate boundaries
(Szulanski, 1996). Yet, practices have a relevant tacit component, because of their embeddedness in individual skills
and potentially complex social interactions. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that when reliance on the trans-
fer of best practices prevails, excessive tacitness results in barriers to imitation, transfer, and absorption of lessons
learned from experience (Simonin, 1999), thus hindering alliance performance (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009). In fact,
Alliance management knowledge and performance 3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/icc/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/icc/dty037/5101392 by BIBLIO
TEC
A FAC
O
LTA'G
IU
R
ISPR
U
D
EN
ZA user on 27 Septem
ber 2018
knowledge stickiness results in higher costs of knowledge transfer related to the need for making highly embedded
knowledge usable by other parties involved (Szulanski, 1996).
Considering the above arguments, we posit that tacit AMK does contribute to the overall alliance performance,
but an upper limit exists over which the marginal beneficial effect of accumulating tacit AMK does not provide incre-
mental benefits to the learning process, requiring alternative actions for performance to improve. Therefore, a first
hypothesis is presented as follows, suggesting a curvilinear relationship:
H1: The relationship between reliance on tacit AMK and alliance performance follows an inverted U-shape.
2.1.2 The pros and cons of relying on codified AMK
The limitations of experiential learning urged researchers to focus on other sources of alliance capability develop-
ment. Considering alliance management know-how as a dynamic capability, and alliances as heterogeneous, infre-
quent, and causally ambiguous events, some authors suggested that superior performance is likely to evolve not only
from tacit accumulation of experience but also explicit knowledge articulation and codification (Zollo and Winter,
2002). Extending the work on codified knowledge in acquisitions (Zollo and Singh, 2004) to the field of strategic alli-
ances, Kale and Singh (2007) argue that codification of accumulated alliance knowledge represents an important
form of learning and might positively affect alliance capabilities and, thus, alliance outcomes.
Simonin (1997) argues that experience is only valuable when it is organized into specific know-how; prior work
on the topic highlights the importance of making knowledge explicit to improve alliance success (Nonaka, 1994;
Draulans et al., 2003). Particularly relevant has appeared to be the presence of codified knowledge in the form of,
among the others, manuals, blueprints, and checklists. Indeed, the implementation of these tools can be beneficial to
alliance performance for numerous reasons. To begin with, the institution of codified knowledge necessitates the ar-
ticulation of prior experience embedded in individuals and, therefore, reduces the likelihood of losing it due to time
deterioration, employees’ turnover, and fragmented learning (Levinthal and March, 1993; Heimeriks and Duysters,
2007). Furthermore, dedicated artifacts can be easily reused and shared across the company, increasing the efficiency
of alliance management and guiding the actions of inexperienced managers and partners. As a matter of fact, the
presence of well-defined procedures and actions to be taken during the different phases of the alliance life cycle might
guide the decision-making process, especially in conditions of high uncertainty due to unfamiliar and thorny issues.
Finally, codification fosters alliance performance because managers are likely to sharpen their understanding of
cause–effect relationships during the codification process itself, when they are compelled to draw consistent infer-
ences from prior lessons and reflect on alliance experience (Nonaka, 1994; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Kale and Singh,
2007). Indeed, the codification process can be considered as a higher-order experiential learning where actors create
mental maps regarding spatial, temporal, and causal relationships (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). Furthermore, the
development of logically sound and effortful tools might go further the simple elaboration of causal relationships and
patterns (double-loop learning), creating also a mechanism of triple-loop learning in which the several codification
processes become opportunities to shape alliance knowledge and develop new sources of alliance capabilities devel-
opment (Flood and Romm, 1996).
However, knowledge codification is also a double-edge mechanism (Heimeriks, 2010). Although it is likely to en-
hance alliance capabilities, an increasing level of codification can also trigger inertial behavior and rigidity, reducing
time-efficiency and the number of opportunities considered, and, thus, negatively affecting alliance performance
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Heimeriks, 2010).
The main limitation of codification is that not all the nuances and richness of knowledge can be codified and rede-
ployed. Indeed, there is a limit to the degree to which knowledge can be encoded due to its personal nature and situ-
ation specificity (Nonaka, 1994; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Moreover, the crisper understanding of the drivers of
superior alliance performance developed during the codification process might involve only a restricted number of
people within the company, if not supported by the creation of appropriate integration and diffusion mechanisms.
The superior understanding of the action–performance linkages could even remain embedded in the minds of the
individuals directly involved in the articulation and codification mechanisms, without the right incentives for deliber-
ate learning (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Additionally, when firms rely only on standardized processes, they might re-
duce their ability to identify innovations and pursue improvements and, thus, reduce experimentation and
exploration of new behaviors and patterns, which represent crucial aspects of alliance capability enhancement
(Heimeriks, 2010). Therefore, an excessive use of standardized tools might be characterized by the fallacies of
4 A. Russo and C. Vurro
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/icc/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/icc/dty037/5101392 by BIBLIO
TEC
A FAC
O
LTA'G
IU
R
ISPR
U
D
EN
ZA user on 27 Septem
ber 2018
detachment, predetermination, and formalization (Mintzberg, 1994), which can lead to the reduction of the positive
effects of codification. As in the case of tacit AMK, we consider, therefore, the positive effect of codified AMK, until
the excessive accumulation of codified knowledge drives to detrimental effects on the marginal benefits of the learn-
ing process for successful alliances. The considerations mentioned above lead to a second hypothesis as follows, sug-
gesting a curvilinear relationship:
H2: The relationship between reliance on codified AMK and alliance performance follows an inverted U-shape.
2.2 The moderating role of the DAF
Heeding the call for a richer understanding of the antecedents of alliance success, many studies have moved away
from internal processes aimed at deploying tacit and codified AMK. Recent research has turned its attention to alli-
ance management structures (Draulans et al., 2003), as higher-order organizing mechanisms underlying the further
enhancement of alliance capabilities and related performance (Kale et al., 2002; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006;
Kale and Singh, 2009).
DAFs are among the most debated of those higher-order mechanisms. The notion that this function plays an im-
portant role in building firm-level alliance capability is well established in the literature (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale et al.,
2002; Draulans et al., 2003; Kale and Singh, 2007). Dyer et al. (2001, p. 38) describe the DAF as the function that
“coordinates all alliance-related activity within the organization and is charged with institutionalizing processes and
systems to teach, share, and leverage prior alliance-management experience and know-how within the company.”
Other definitions followed highlighting different aspects of the roles for the DAF.1
Despite heterogeneity in perspectives and focus, literature converges on defining the DAF as a formal organiza-
tional structure mandated with responsibility for: (i) storing lessons learned and best practices in alliance manage-
ment with the aim to leverage on, develop, and disseminate alliance management know-how (Dyer et al., 2001;
Kale et al., 2002); (ii) signaling firms’ propensity and attitude toward alliance management with the aim to strength-
en external and internal visibility, attractiveness, and legitimacy so that resource mobilization becomes easier
(Draulans et al., 2003); (iii) coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating alliance-related processes along the entire alli-
ance life cycle and across alliance portfolios with the aim to support knowledge transfer within and between organi-
zations, as well as to take corrective actions when needed (Kale and Singh, 1999; Heimeriks et al., 2009).
Prior work has focused mainly on the direct effect of the presence of this function on alliance performance,
neglecting the analysis of how it may affect the relationship between reliance on tacit and codified knowledge and al-
liance performance. Further, our knowledge of the key characteristics of a DAF is still limited (Kale and Singh,
2009), and additional research on the impact of these features on the relationship between AMK and alliance per-
formance is needed.
2.2.1 DAF, tacitness, and alliance performance
As experiential learning increases leading to the accumulation of tacit AMK, the presence of the DAF has many roles
to play in leveraging tacitness and improve alliance performance. First, the DAF is by definition an institutionalized
locus of learning (Pisano, 1994) for assimilating, developing, and disseminating sticky lessons learned and best practi-
ces (Dyer et al., 2001; Draulans et al., 2003), on partner selection, negotiation, or governance structures.
Accordingly, the DAF is likely to become the repository of alliance knowledge, accumulated through multiple rela-
tionships and usually dispersed among numerous managers. Indeed, the DAF becomes the focal point for learning
and for leveraging lessons and feedbacks from prior and ongoing alliances.
Second, by forcing codification into fairly stable and repetitive patterns, the DAF facilitates replication, fosters
the transfer of practices and tacit knowledge, and sets the basis for an alliance capability (Kale and Singh, 2009).
In effect, it consistently establishes standardized procedures to articulate, document, codify, and share know-how
about alliance management (Dyer et al., 2001). In so doing, it counters the natural tendency of benefits derived from
experience to depreciate over time (Sampson, 2005), as well as the risk of losing important knowledge if those who
possess it were to leave the organization (Kale et al., 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007).
1 Appendix A presents a review of the most recent contribution on the role of the DAF.
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Furthermore, by providing a legitimate place for the socialization of tacit knowledge, the DAF has the potential
to at least partially overcome some of the barriers to tacit knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 1996). In fact, the exchange
of knowledge, which is not codified due to high costs or non-codifiability (Zander and Kogut, 1995) and to its strong
social component, is facilitated when formal structures are in place to promote and legitimate personal interaction
(Levinthal and March, 1993; Nonaka, 1994; Heimeriks, 2010).
Finally, the DAF plays the crucial role of constantly monitoring and evaluating alliance performance (Kale et al.,
2002; Draulans et al., 2003). This task is paramount for the deployment of tacit knowledge. In fact, it is necessary to
increase the sense-making awareness about prior alliance outcomes and reveal relevant causes and contingencies
(Zollo and Winter, 2002) to benefit from an improved alliance performance. When tacit knowledge prevails, causal
ambiguity and unprovenness have a strong impact on reducing the ease of knowledge transfer and codification
(Szulanski, 1996). Indeed, without a constant evaluation of the ongoing relationships and the debriefing of managers,
it is more difficult to extrapolate valuable lessons from prior alliance experience, especially when knowledge remains
not codified.
As a whole, the DAF facilitates alliance-related learning processes nurtured by experience and related tacit know-
ledge accumulation, thus leading to more effective management of future and ongoing alliance and turning into
greater alliance success. In light of these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: The presence of the DAF positively moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between reliance on tacit AMK and alli-
ance performance.
2.2.2 DAF, codification, and alliance performance
Besides acting as a facilitator in deploying tacit AMK, the DAF is conducive to better combinations of codified AMK
(Nonaka, 1994).
As previously defined, codified knowledge is task-related knowledge in the form of objects or resources such
as, for example, alliance guidelines or manuals conceived to help managers handle alliances over their entire life
cycle. Yet, codification per se is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of firm-wide alliance
management capabilities. On one side, more proactive and deliberate efforts are needed to translate mere docu-
mentation of alliance history into critical assessments and usable management tools (Zollo and Winter, 2002;
Kale and Singh, 2007). On the other side, blueprints and rules of thumb could be routinely followed on a con-
tinuous basis without any deliberate effort to learn from them and adapt generalized AMK to partner-specific sit-
uations (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Lavie et al., 2012). Given its critical role in supporting interaction and
know-how sharing, the DAF enables those involved in managing alliances in turning artifacts into usable, useful
management tools. Having such a function not only supports firms in the codification process of tacit knowledge
into replicable practices but also in the identification and selection of the most suitable ones in given situations
(Kale and Singh, 2007).
Additionally, having a centralized coordination of alliance-related tasks is beneficial for the correct exploitation
of explicit AMK, in that it supports efficiency in knowledge search within the company. Especially as the number of
alliances that firms manage simultaneously increases, it may be very difficult to use the right tools in the most appro-
priate context (Kale et al., 2002; Heimeriks et al., 2009). Accordingly, the presence of a specialized structure fosters
the discovery and use of the most effective tools to manage the key phases of the alliance life cycle (Cohen and
Bacdayan, 1994).
Finally, by providing strong incentives and motivations for alliance monitoring and metrics development, the
DAF is fundamental to update and modify the tools that might be deployed to guide alliance management. Indeed,
outdated and unquestioned artifacts might be detrimental because managers rely on them as the “last word” and
may reduce future efforts to renovate alliance management practices (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Conversely, the con-
tinuous revision of the effectiveness of the artifacts is likely to improve alliance capabilities and, thus, enhance alli-
ance performance. Therefore, these arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H4: The presence of the DAF positively moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between reliance on codified AMK and al-
liance performance.
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2.3 DAF diversity, reliance on AMK, and alliance performance
Building on empirical evidence showing organizational outcomes as a function of the characteristics of the teams
involved (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), many studies are currently suggesting that the composition of the DAF is
likely to play an important role in explaining its moderating impact on alliance performance (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale
and Singh, 2009). Since investing in the creation of a DAF entails costs and efforts, a deeper understanding of how to
configure it to benefit the most is a compelling question. Among the many facets that remain under-investigated, we
decided to focus on how DAF diversity influences the relationship between reliance on tacit and codified AMK and
alliance performance.
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) suggest that alliance capability development is hampered by cognitive limitations.
Indeed, considering the complex nature of alliances, managers face serious challenges when they try to draw valuable
lessons from prior experience. As a consequence, DAF diversity has a role to play in countering both the risks of mis-
taken generalization of one alliance to the next (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) and the likelihood of deploying
written tools erroneously (Heimeriks, 2010).
Abundant theoretical and empirical evidence on the performance consequences of management team’s compos-
ition has converged on demographic characteristics of teams’ members as valid proxies of cognitive frameworks
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hambrick et al., 1996). Early team diversity research has focused on the performance
consequences of know-how heterogeneity as resembled by past educational and life events, that is, educational diver-
sity (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Accordingly, a more heterogeneous educational background is likely to favor the
ability to address the numerous nuances of the alliance process more effectively and enhance the adaptability of the
team to different circumstances. Moreover, pluralism in teams is likely to favor the scouting of divers alliance port-
folios, thus turning into improved performance (Beckman et al., 2014).
Beyond know-how rooted into educational backgrounds, professional diversity, derived from distinct functional
experiences (i.e., functional diversity), has emerged as a relevant predictor of teams’ successful strategic choices (Buyl
et al., 2011). Functionally diverse teams have a larger repertoire of skills and perspectives, as well as non-redundant
peer networks. These attributes turn into easier access to unique information and improved decision-making.
Finally, tenure heterogeneity directly affects managers’ experiences and perspectives, as well as their beliefs,
increasing the cognitive diversity and improving the quality of decisions. In particular, different experience periods
are important to guarantee different attitudes within the team (Nadolska and Barkema, 2014).
Based on existing literature, DAF diversity has a role to play in deploying both tacit and codified alliance know-
ledge. As far as tacit AMK is concerned, prior research suggests that firms can leverage prior experience when this is
substantially heterogeneous. Van Knippenberg et al. (2004) suggest that heterogeneity is more likely to benefit per-
formance when group task ability is higher; therefore, higher levels of DAF diversity are expected to foster learning
processes (Jehn et al., 1999). Indeed, when reliance on tacit AMK is low, members’ heterogeneity is likely to bring to-
gether diverse perspectives turning into improved decision-making (Mihalache et al., 2012). When the use of tacit
AMK increases, heterogeneity is likely to increase the propensity for an extensive and meaningful confrontation of
views, inhibiting superstitious learning (Zollo, 2009). Similarly, the presence of multiple perspectives, ideas, and
capabilities reduces the risk of learning myopia and competence traps that are typical of extensive experiential learn-
ing (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and March, 1988). Indeed, the likely presence of different experiences among
the members of the unit increases the possibility of considering multiple opportunities instead of relying on a one-
dimensional, potentially fallacious experiential wisdom.
Thus, we hypothesize:
H5: DAF (i) educational, (ii) functional, and (iii) tenure diversity positively moderate the inverted U-shaped relationship between
reliance on tacit AMK and alliance performance.
DAF diversity can be expected to have an important role in the deployment of codified knowledge, too. Similarly
to what happens in top management teams dealing with technology transfer (Knockaert et al., 2011) or innovation
through offshoring (Mihalache et al., 2012), diversity supports the team in managing and coordinating dispersed
knowledge, as well as in recognizing superior alternatives when dealing with new tasks (Simonin, 1997).
When codification increases, DAF diversity is likely to counter the risk for firms to remain stuck in their own rou-
tines. Instead, group variety enhances knowledge creation, information processing, and the development of new
ideas, reducing the likelihood of inertial behavior (Nonaka, 1994; van der Vegt and Bunderson, 2005). As a matter
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of fact, many studies suggest that heterogeneous teams are more willing to pursue innovative strategies and to engage
in change (Milliken and Martins, 1996). Conversely, a high level of homogeneity in the accumulated stock of prior
experiences tends to favor complacency and excessive simplicity (Miller, 1999).
Thus, we hypothesize:
H6: DAF (i) educational, (ii) functional, and (iii) tenure diversity positively moderate the inverted U-shaped relationship between
reliance on codified AMK and alliance performance.
A representation of the theoretical framework of this study is presented in Figure 1.
3. Methods
3.1 Sample and data collection
To investigate the influence of relying on different types of AMK on alliance performance, as well as the moderating
role of having the DAF with certain attributes, we focused on the firm as the unit of analysis and collected survey-
based data.
Given the paucity of studies having analyzed the interaction between mechanisms to build firm-wide alliance cap-
ability, as well as boundary conditions making them effective, we were urged to select companies that repeatedly
engaged in alliances, and which considered alliances as a key tool of their corporate strategy (Heimeriks et al., 2009).
This sampling strategy was needed to maximize the chance to test and validate our hypotheses, in line with the ob-
jective of our research and to strengthen representativeness. In fact, according to prior research firms holding the
abovementioned characteristics are more likely to present different levels of AMK, either tacit or codified, and might
be more interested in deploying specialized structures to enhance their alliance performance (Kale et al., 2002).
We went through the following three-step process to select our sample. First, we started from those industries
that, according to prior research, were consistently reporting higher propensity to ally. In line with previous studies,
we identified computers, electronics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and biotechnologies, chemicals, machi-
neries, transportation, and financial services as a set of industries where it was likely to observe expected patterns
(Kale and Singh, 1999; Kale and Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Industry categories were identified on the
basis of three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Second, we selected large firms in each of the
Figure 1. Theoretical framework.
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industry categories listed above, which reached more than e70 million (approximately $100 million) in annual reve-
nues and had more than 100 employees in 2015. Consistently with prior studies on alliance capability (Kale and
Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), large firms are usually engaged in a significantly greater number of rela-
tionships than small firms (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). These thresholds have been considered relevant, as
they represent a valuable proxy of firms’ managerial and financial resource endowments. Companies were identified
through Orbis database, using appropriate filters for industry categories, size, and revenue classes. Third, we looked
for contact information on a senior executive who might be in charge of or involved in the firm’s alliance activities.
In line with existing studies, top executives represented the most qualified respondents, due to the strategic nature of
the content and the cross-corporate issues involved in alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Moreover, we
focused on executives in charge of the corporate development, corporate planning, and alliance or merger & acquisi-
tion (M&A) department. These managers not only were likely to be more informed about alliance practices but also
had more interest in the completion of the questionnaire (Kale and Singh, 1999). In case this role was missing within
the company’s organization chart, the survey was directly sent to the CEO or a member of the Board of Directors,
who have been also considered appropriate respondents in prior alliance studies (Simonin, 1997; Draulans et al.,
2003). To access the appropriate contact person within the organization, a combination of secondary data provided
by Zephyr and Thomson One Banker databases, as well as social media (e.g., ASAP group) was used. In some cases,
a direct contact with the company or the review of its website allowed the identification of the key informant or the
obtainment of the necessary contact.
An initial sample of 1150 e-mail contacts was created, and hence, an e-mail questionnaire was sent in 2015 to
managers’ personal e-mail addresses by using a two-wave (e)mailing approach, with a reminder after a time lapse of
10 days, which underlined the relevance of the study and acknowledged the receivers that the questionnaire was not
an unsolicited e-mail (see Appendix B for the structure of the survey). After the two rounds, we received
120 responses, of which 113 were complete (corresponding to an overall response rate of about 10%), each corre-
sponding to a single-firm in the sample. Furthermore, the 63% of the responding firms had a dedicated unit to
Table 1. Sample description
DAF DAF (%) Ave. no. of previous alliances
DAF
No Yes Total No Yes Total No Yes Total
Country
Northern Europe 7 28 35 20 80 31
Southern Europe 27 20 47 57 43 42
The United States 4 15 19 21 79 17
Other countries 3 9 12 25 75 11
Industry
Industrial 20 24 44 45 55 39
Service 3 12 15 20 80 13
IT 5 24 29 17 83 26
Other industries 13 12 25 52 48 22
Alliance experience
>5 12 15 27 44 56 24 36 45 81
5–10 20 13 33 61 39 29 160 104 264
11–15 5 13 18 28 72 16 65 169 234
15–20 11 11 0 100 10 0 198 198
<20 4 20 24 17 83 21 100 500 600
Reliance on AMK
Tacit < average 15 24 39 38 62 35
Tacit > average 26 48 74 35 65 65
Codified < average 14 18 32 44 56 28
Codified > average 27 54 81 33 67 72
Alliance management knowledge and performance 9
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manage alliances; on average these structures involved six to eight people and were in place for 7–8 years. Details on
the distribution of the sample are reported in Table 1.
Though sample size is relatively small, it is aligned with highly cited research based on primary data collection on
the performance consequences of firm-wide alliance capability (Kale et al., 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007; Heimeriks
et al., 2009; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009).
Furthermore, to verify the quality of the data, we performed two sets of data analysis. First, we checked the pres-
ence of common method bias, which is typical of self-administered surveys and can result in measurement errors
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Accordingly, the Harman’s one factor test was conducted.
All the items associated with tacit and codified AMK and alliance performance were entered into an exploratory fac-
tor analysis, using an unrotated principal components factor analysis, a principal component analysis with varimax
rotation, and a principal axis analysis with varimax rotation. This procedure allowed determining how many factors
were necessary to account for the variance in the variables, and testing if one general factor accounted for the major-
ity of the covariance among the variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All the three analyses revealed the presence of
three distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, rather than a single major one. The three factors together
accounted for 60.5% of the total variance in the principal component factor analysis and 69.48% in the principal
axis analysis, while the first and largest factor did not account for the majority of the variance (41.87% and 44.69%,
respectively, in the principal component and principal axis analysis). Thus, no general factor was apparent in the
data collected, suggesting that common method bias was not of great concern and, thus, unlikely to affect the inter-
pretation of the results for this research.
Second, we performed an assessment of potential non-response bias, by identifying possible differences between
early and late respondents, under the assumption that late respondents are similar to non-respondent than early
respondents are to non-respondents (Klijn et al., 2013). Two-sample t-tests for these classes of respondents suggested
that no significant differences existed with respect to alliance experience (t¼0.31, n.s.), age (t¼0.48, n.s.), and size
(t¼0.40, n.s.). Thus, these tests do not provide evidence that the data are subject to non-response bias.
3.2 Operationalization of key variables
3.2.1 Dependent variable: alliance performance
Despite having been included in many alliance studies, alliance performance has not a single measurement approach.
On one side, studies have focused on financial gains associated to performance, such as, for example, profits, sales,
or abnormal stock market returns after announcements of alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Rocha-Goncalves
and Gonc¸alves, 2011). Yet, most alliances do not report financial performance, which has been proved in any case to
be biased by partners’ accounting preferences (Krishnan et al., 2006). In an attempt to overcome the limits of finan-
cial measures in providing consistent and uniform ways of measuring performance across large, heterogeneous and
multi-geography samples (Gulati, 1999), a second measurement approach has emerged based on managers’ evalu-
ation of the extent to which the competitive position of the firm has improved as a result of the alliances performed
in a given time frame, or the extent to which the firm has acquired skills from alliance partners, thus considering alli-
ances successful (Draulans et al., 2003; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). The superiority of managerial evaluation
over financial returns has been further corroborated by Geringer and Hebert (1991), who demonstrated a high level
of correlation between managerial assessments and accounting and financial measures. This confirms the robustness
of the former compared to the latter.
Instead of relying on single-item evaluations of alliance performance focused on specific issues (e.g., the extent to
which an alliance has contributed to competitive advantage of the core firm), research has demonstrated the superior-
ity of multi-item scales of performance in disentangling the multifaceted nature of alliance performance (Kale and
Singh, 2007).
Therefore, we decided to estimate the overall firm’s alliance performance based on respondents’ self-assessment.
Therefore, we first adapted the five-item measure of alliance performance from Kale and Singh (2007). Accordingly,
we included assessments referred to the quality of the relationships, the degree of goals fulfillment, the impact on
competitive position and skill enhancement, and overall assessment of alliance success. We then added an additional
item, that is, the extent to which respondents perceived the allies to be satisfied with the focal organization as a good
partner. Even if based on perceptions, bringing in perspectives of other partners involved has emerged as enriching
10 A. Russo and C. Vurro
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the robustness of self-evaluated performance (Krishnan et al., 2006). We also reverse-coded one of the items to con-
trol and limit the response pattern bias. Respondents used a simple seven-point Likert scale to give their level of
agreement/disagreement on the six items (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale and Singh, 2007), explicitly referred to alliances
completed over the previous 3 years, namely, between 2012 and 2014. With a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89, the perform-
ance scale demonstrated high reliability.
The firm-specific values of the dependent variable resulted from an exploratory factor analysis. The appropriate-
ness of the resulting construct was supported by the results of the KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity tests. Indeed, the
KMO coefficient was above the common threshold of 0.7 and the Bartlett’s test highly significant, supporting the
construct’s robustness. Moreover, considering the presence of only one factor, we verified if the results of the factor
analysis significantly differed from the mean of the items. This was not the case supporting the robustness of the final
measure built through the factor analysis (please, see Appendix B for factor analysis details).
3.2.2 Independent variables: reliance on tacit and codified AMK
The predictors of the analysis, namely, reliance on tacit and codified AMK, have been measured through the combin-
ation of several items. A four-item measure was created for reliance on tacit AMK, adapting the knowledge sharing
scale developed by Dyer et al. (2001) and Kale and Singh (2007) on experiential alliance knowledge. Reliance on tacit
AMK referred to the degree to which managers share and use tacit know-how and lessons learned by doing within
the firm through formal and informal communities, personnel rotations, and other knowledge-sharing activities.
Reliance on codified AMK was measured using the four-item scale of alliance knowledge codification developed
by Kale and Singh (2007) and adapted from the study by Zollo and Singh (2004). Respondents were asked to assess
their agreement/disagreement on the following aspects of codification: the extent to which alliance know-how was
articulated and formalized in specific tools and how these tools were deployed in alliance management processes.
Both for tacit and codified AMK, respondents were explicitly asked to rate their agreement/disagreement with the
statements in the questionnaire on a seven-point Likert scale and refer to alliances managed over the previous 3-year
period (i.e., between 2012 and 2014).
Consistently with the procedure followed for the dependent variable, we therefore run an exploratory factor ana-
lysis related to the two constructs, to test their validity and reliability. First, we identified the presence of items that
correlated weakly with the related construct, and, second, we investigated redundancy or duplication between items.
For the purpose of this test, an item–total correlation below 0.40 represented an item with a poor relationship with
the underlying construct. Conversely, an item-total correlation greater than 0.90 suggested the presence of redun-
dancy and duplication. The results showed that only one element (Factor 1 in the reliance on tacit knowledge con-
struct, referred to whether alliance managers relied on prior experience to guide the formation or management of
alliances) was not in the acceptable range and, thus, dropped from the analysis. The reason for exclusion is probably
due to the fact that relying on previous experience cannot be exclusively related to a specific type of AMK. Overall,
the results of the item–total correlation tests strongly supported the assumption of items and constructs validity.
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients have been computed for each variable (Cronbach’s alpha for tacit AMK ¼ 0.71;
Cronbach’s alpha for codified AMK ¼ 0.90). All the calculated alphas were above the threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally,
1970) and none of them could be improved eliminating one of the items, confirming the strong reliability of the con-
structs elaborated. Furthermore, the appropriateness of the resulting construct was supported by the results of the
KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity tests. Indeed, the KMO coefficient was aligned to the common threshold of 0.7 and
the Bartlett’s test highly significant, supporting the construct’s robustness analysis (see Appendix B for factor analysis
details).
3.2.3 Moderating factors
Dedicated alliance function: The presence of the DAF was assessed using a dummy variable (Kale and Singh, 2007;
Heimeriks et al., 2009). Firms reporting to have the DAF were therefore coded as 1, 0 otherwise.
DAF diversity: To assess the diversity of the members of the DAF, multiple questions on the background and ex-
perience of the managers have been posed in three different sections of the questionnaire. The degree of diversity was
calculated through the Blau’s index, which is a generally accepted measure of heterogeneity in a management team
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). This index was computed as 1(Pi)2, where Pi is the percentage of individuals in
the ith category, respectively, educational, functional, and tenure diversity; therefore, the higher is the resulting score,
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the greater the heterogeneity on a specific dimension. In this case, we deployed a 0–100 scale, to increase the differen-
tiation with the firms without the DAF. Considering the above three i categories used in this study, respondents were
asked to assess educational diversity by reporting the percent distribution of the different educational backgrounds
(business, engineering, law, etc.) across the team members. Similarly, functional diversity has been calculated consid-
ering the percentage of members with experience in a specific organizational function (R&D, finance, business man-
agement, etc.). Finally, tenure diversity has been based on the percent distribution across different years of
experience of the members within the DAF of the focal firm.
3.2.4 Controls
Several controls were included in the analysis to account for both exogenous influences on alliance performance and
unobserved individual heterogeneity. To control for country effects and industry effects, we included a full set of
dummies, one for each country and sector. Specifically, countries included in the sample aggregated into four catego-
ries: Northern Europe, Southern Europe, the United States, and other countries. Industry effects referred to the sector
mentioned above in the sample selection section, and further aggregated into the four categories, that is, industrials,
service, IT, and other industries. Prior research has suggested that larger firms are more likely to enter into alliance
relationships than smaller firms (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Dickson and Weaver, 1997). We therefore,
controlled for firm size as reported by respondents in the survey. Similarly, we controlled for firm age to account for
potential inertial forces based on experience (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). Both firm size and age were referred to the
year before the survey was completed, i.e., 2015. Respondents were asked to report on their age and size across four
categories (e.g., less than 5 years for age and less than 200 employees for size). We then substituted the category
means (e.g., between 200 and 500 becomes 350) for our subsequent analysis.
Prior research has pointed out to the relevance of alliance experience in explaining alliance performance (Anand
and Khanna, 2000). Hence, we controlled for this variable asking respondents to report the number of signed alli-
ances over the 5-year period preceding the time frame for performance assessment (i.e., between 2008 and 2012).
A 5-year period is a generally accepted time frame to examine the contribution of alliance experience on alliance
performance (Kale et al., 2002; Zollo et al., 2002). Given our research design, we cannot fully account for
inter-temporal learning effects, which could have affected later performance assessment. Yet, we attempted to at least
partially lag alliance experience and alliance success by referring the two variables to different time windows. As for
age and size, respondents self-selected their position across five alliance experience’s classes. We than substituted the
category means for subsequent analysis.
The reliance on self-assessed performance measures could be biased by unobserved characteristics of the respond-
ents, as well as the role played by the focal organization in the alliance or the context in which alliances took place.
Alliance types, partner composition, and embeddedness into contexts have proved to be significant in affecting alli-
ance behavior and related performance (Krishnan et al., 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Hottenrott and Lopes-
Bento, 2015; Niesten and Jolink, 2015). Large evidence exists on the influence of national culture on people’s value
and perceptions, decision-making, strategy formulation, and inter-firm cooperation (Child and Faulkner, 1998).
Consistently with previous research, we controlled for the two most significant dimensions of national culture as
developed by Hofstede (1991) in predicting firm behavior and organization, that is, uncertainty avoidance and power
distance (Golonka and Rzadca, 2013). To account for context-related factors potentially affecting alliance propensity
and perceived performance (Rowley et al., 2000), we controlled for regulatory quality and rule of law country-
indexes (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Such indicators are reflexive of country-specific risks that have emerged as influenc-
ing firm ability to benefit from alliances (Nielsen, 2007). In fact, political instability and lack of adequate regulatory
infrastructure increase uncertainty with respect to property rights or legitimate returns, thus turning into lower alli-
ance performance because of the need to incur into additional transactional and information processing costs along
the whole alliance life cycle.
Finally, since both tacit and codified AMK are expected to have an impact on alliance performance, they are con-
sistently and alternatively included in all the regression models as controls.
3.3 Data analysis
Although continuous, our measure of alliance performance has boundaries by construction. In fact, it cannot take
values less than 0, as well as it is right-censored, with three firms reporting the highest possible value across all items
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of the alliance performance scale. Thus, we used Tobit regression analysis as an appropriate form of regression when
the dependent variable is censored (Maddala, 1983). Having analyzed the sample to test for normality and linearity,
we discovered that our dependent variable had a significant skewness of 1.35 (P < 0.000) and slightly significant
excess kurtosis of 1.46 (P < 0.05). As we were concerned with normality, we relaxed the homoscedasticity assump-
tion, thus performing robust standard error estimation. This was confirmed by predicting residuals of ordinary
least square estimations and testing for normality. They resulted non-normally distributed with skewness of 1.38
(P < 0.000) and kurtosis of 6.87 (P < 0.05).
To test curvilinear hypotheses, we squared tacit and codified AMK and entered them in the regression together
with the linear effect.
To test interaction effects, we standardized the key variables prior to forming interaction terms (Jaccard and
Turrisi, 2003). We used a hierarchical regression approach to test our hypotheses, including the control variables
first, and then the predictors and moderating effects.
4. Results
4.1 Sample characteristics and correlations
Tables 1 and 2 show, respectively, the sample description and the descriptive statistics. About 64% of the firms in
the sample have the DAF. On average, a firm in the sample had perceived its alliance performance as moderately suc-
cessful during the period 2012–2014. The average score of reliance on tacit AMK to manage alliances is 4.61, which
is placed in between slightly and moderate agreement. The average score of reliance on codified AMK is slightly
lower than the level of agreement on the use of tacit AMK, and equal to 4.03. Among firms with the DAF, 65% of
the sample relied more on tacit AMK than the average. Similarly, 67% of the firms relied more on codified AMK
than the average. Approximately 29% of the firms had completed between 5 and 10 alliances during the period
2008–2012. The cumulated alliance experience of the firms in the sample is roughly 600 alliances. Firms with the
DAF account for the majority of completed alliances.
On average, firms in the sample have 787 employees. The average age is equal to 25 years. As for the DAF com-
position, functional diversity is approximately higher than educational and tenure diversity, with an average score of
37.52.
The cross-correlation between the key variables is as expected. The results show that all the explanatory variables,
including the moderating ones, have a positive and significant relationship with alliance performance. In particular,
reliance on tacit AMK has the highest correlate (r¼0.48; P < 0.01) with alliance performance. In line with previous
literature, size, age, and alliance experience strongly correlate with alliance performance. Having the DAF has a posi-
tive, significant correlation with perceived alliance performance. The same holds for diversity across the three
attributes.
4.2 Modeling and hypotheses testing
Next, the regression results of the impact of reliance on tacit and codified AMK on alliance performance are pre-
sented. The first model in Table 3 includes the direct effects of reliance on tacit and codified AMK and all control
variables. In line with previous work, the effect parameters of tacit and codified AMK were positive and strongly sig-
nificant (respectively, r¼ 0.31 with P< 0.01 and r¼ 0.21 with P< 0.01). It implies that after including all the control
variables, the higher the reliance on both types of AMK, the larger the perceived alliance performance. It was also
confirmed that firm size and previous alliance experience are positively associated with alliance performance. Age
has a negative and significant association with alliance experience, suggesting that older firms are less likely to ex-
tract benefits from completed alliances. The effect of level of regulatory quality was also positive (r¼0.23) but only
marginally significant (P< 0.10). No effect of the other context-related indicators was found.
Model 2 added the squared terms of reliance on tacit and codified AMK. This model tested our first two hypothe-
ses that the positive relationships between reliance on both knowledge types and alliance performance decreases or
even turns negative for high levels of knowledge use. Reliance on tacit AMK and its squared value are both statistical-
ly significant. First, reliance on tacit AMK enters positively (r¼0.43, P< 0.05). The negative, significant sign on the
second-order term (r ¼ 0.27, P< 0.05) suggests that H1 is supported. The same holds for reliance on codified
AMK. The direct effect and the second-order effect are both marginally significant with the expected signs. In fact,
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reliance on codified AMK has a positive direct impact on alliance performance (r¼ 0.26, P<0.10). Yet, high levels
of reliance on this knowledge type turns into decreased performance (r ¼ 0.03, P< 0.05). Accordingly, H2 found
marginal statistical support.
To further confirm the hypothesized U-shaped relationships between reliance on tacit and codified AMK and
alliance performance, we performed the U-test suggested by Lind and Mehlum (2010). In particular, we tested
for the slope of the curve at several points in a linear ordinary least squares model. Both for tacit and codified
AMK, the estimated maximum is well within the data range (respectively, 4.55 and 4.23). Moreover, the t-statis-
tics for lower and upper bound are significant, thus supporting the hypotheses of an inverted U-shape for both
knowledge types.2
To gain more insights into the magnitude of the effects, we calculated the marginal predictions and average mar-
ginal effects of our explanatory variables on alliance performance at different values of the distribution of both reli-
ance on tacit AMK and use of codification (Greene, 2010). The results are graphically reported in Figure 2.
The left-hand side shows the predictive margins and the right-hand side the average marginal effects over
the range of possible levels of reliance on tacit and codified AMK. As for tacit AMK, it increasingly improves
alliance performance in the range between strong disagreement and slight agreement of firms’ reliance on tacit-
ness to manage alliances. The impact of reliance on tacit AMK turns negative when managers declare to mod-
erately and strongly rely on tacitness. The right-hand side shows the derivative, that is, the slope of the
predictive margins curve. It indicates the magnitude of the impact of a marginal increase in reliance on tacit
AMK on the outcome variable. It is clear that the returns to increasing reliance on tacitness are decreasing and
turns negative around 4.00, which corresponds to a slight agreement on the company reliance on this type of
knowledge.
Figure 2. Predictive margins and average marginal effects of reliance on AMK on alliance performance (Model 2; 95% confidence
intervals).
2 For reliance on tacit AMK, the t-values are equal to 2.08 for the lower bound (P < 0.05) and 1.60 for the upper bound
(P < 0.05). The overall test of presence of an inverted U-shape rejects the null hypotheses with t-value equal to 1.60 (P
< 0.05). As for reliance on codified AMK, the t-values are equal to 1.54 for the lower bound (P < 0.05) and 1.50 for the
upper bound (P < 0.05). The overall test of presence of an inverted U-shape rejects the null hypotheses with t-value
equal to 1.49 (P < 0.05).
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A similar pattern emerges for reliance on codified AMK. Different from tacit AMK, the impact of reliance
on codification starts decreasing when the explanatory variable reaches a value around 6.00, which correspond
to a moderate agreement with the firm’s reliance on codification. The average marginal effects for codification
are slightly different from those related to reliance on tacitness. In fact, returns are first increasing. Then, they
decrease around 2.00 and turn negative for values of the explanatory variable around 6.50. It means that higher
levels of reliance on codified AMK benefit alliance performance more than higher levels of reliance on tacit
AMK.
Model 3 in Table 3 then tested the moderating role of having the DAF on the U-shaped relationship be-
tween reliance on tacit AMK and alliance performance. Results shows that the direct effect of having the
DAF is positive and significant (r¼2.11, P<0.01), thus confirming empirical findings on the beneficial im-
pact of the DAF on alliance performance. More importantly, both the interaction with the linear term and
the squared term are significant (respectively, r ¼ 0.78, P<0.05; r¼0.08, P< 0.10), thus marginally sup-
porting H3. Similarly, Model 4 tested the moderating role of the DAF on the curvilinear relationships be-
tween reliance on codified AMK and alliance performance. The direct effect of having the DAF remains
positive and significant (r¼ 4.50, P< 0.01). The linear interaction and the quadratic interaction are significant
and of the expected signs (respectively, r ¼ 2.10, P<0.01; r¼0.23, P<0.01). The interaction effects con-
firm our H4, suggesting that the DAF reduces the negative impact of increasing levels of reliance on codified
AMK.
Figure 3 shows these contingency effects and reports the predictive margins of reliance on both tacit and codified
AMK on alliance performance for firms with or without the DAF.
For firms with the DAF, alliance performance is higher at low levels of reliance on tacit AMK. It then
decreases until it stabilizes at higher levels compared to those of firms without the DAF. This effect is more pro-
nounced in the case of codified AMK. The right-hand side of the figure shows that the U-shape is positive for
Table 3. Tobit regression models of alliance performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Cons 0.04* 2.010 4.35** 0.550 2.13** 1.865 3.88** 3.466
Age 0.26** 0.050 0.52** 0.087 0.23** 0.052 0.06 0.072
Size 0.66** 0.040 0.00** 0.051 0.68** 0.050 0.14* 0.063
Previous alliance experience 0.14** 0.047 0.08** 0.025 0.05* 0.024 0.12** 0.049
Power distance 0.01 0.057 0.00 0.005 0.03 0.069 0.10 0.123
Uncertainty avoidance 0.00 0.031 0.02 0.036 0.02 0.036 0.05 0.065
Regulatory quality 0.04 1.591 0.24† 0.139 0.69 1.552 3.14 2.917
Rule of law 2.13* 0.891 0.81 0.682 0.83 0.901 2.68† 1.968
Tacit AMK 0.31** 0.079 0.43* 0.219 0.64* 0.266 0.34** 0.080
Codified AMK 0.21** 0.052 0.26† 0.159 0.08 0.205 1.66** 0.420
(Tacit AMK)2 0.37* 0.209 0.07* 0.033 0.05 0.058
(Codified AMK)2 0.03† 0.02 0.15 0.189 0, 17** 0.055
DAF 2.11** 0.684 4.50** 1.037
Tacit AMK*DAF 0.78* 0.342
(Tacit AMK)2*DAF 0.08† 0.041
Codified AMK*DAF 2.10** 0.555
(Codified AMK)2*DAF 0.23** 0.070
Model fit
Observations 113 113 113 113
Left-censored 1 1 1 1
Right-censored 3 3 3 3
Pseudo R2 0.262** 0.220** 0.358** 0.308**
Log likelihood 118.01 44.82 22.69 110.66
Notes: Industry and geographic dummies included, not presented. **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05; †P < 0.10.
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firms with the DAF. In fact, at low and high levels of reliance on codified AMK, the DAF leads to higher alli-
ance performance. The DAF has a detrimental role for alliance performance in those firms with a moderate
reliance on codified AMK.
To go deeper into the investigation of how the DAF moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between reli-
ance on tacit and codified AMK and alliance performance, our last set of hypotheses introduced the moderating role
of DAF diversity across three attributes, that is, educational, functional, and tenure diversity.
Models 5–7 in Table 4 show the results of the interaction between the three DAF attributes and the linear and
squared terms for reliance on tacit AMK. All the attributes have a negative, significant impact when interacted with
the linear term (r ¼ 0.02, P< 0.01 for educational diversity; r ¼ 0.48, P< 0.05 for functional diversity; r ¼
0.03, P< 0.01 for tenure diversity), and a positive, significant impact on alliance performance when interacted
with the squared term (r¼0.01, P<0.01 for educational diversity; r¼ 0.38, P< 0.10 for functional diversity;
r¼0.01, P<0.05 for tenure diversity). Results confirm our H5, pointing out the beneficial impact of DAF diversity
on the ability of firms to exploit tacit AMK. To make use of tacit AMK, educational diversity emerges as the most ef-
fective moderator.
A similar, yet more significant, pattern emerges with the regard to the moderating effect of DAF diversity on the
curvilinear relationship between reliance on codified AMK and alliance performance. Results are reported in Models
8–10, where the three linear interactions are negative and significant, and the quadratic interactions are positive and
significant (respectively, r¼ 1.27, P<0.01 for educational diversity; r¼ 0.01, P< 0.01 for functional diversity;
r¼0.03, P<0.01 for tenure diversity). Results confirm our H6, showing the beneficial impact of DAF diversity on
the ability of firms to exploit codified AMK.
Figure 4 depicts how DAF diversity moderates the nonlinear relationships between reliance on tacit and codified
AMK and alliance performance. The graphs present the predictive margins of reliance on AMK on alliance perform-
ance by the three DAF attributes. We considered 1 standard deviation below and above the mean to represent the
low and high values of DAF educational, functional, and tenure diversity.
The left-hand side reports the predictive margins of reliance on tacit AMK on alliance performance by DAF edu-
cational, functional, and tenure diversity, while the right-hand side shows the predictive margins of reliance on codi-
fied AMK.
Similar patterns emerge across the different DAF attributes. The graphs indicate an inverted U-shape for average
values of reliance on both types of knowledge. For firms DAF diversity that is 1 standard deviation above the mean,
the U-shape is positive, meaning that those firms relying on low and high levels of both knowledge types experience
improved alliance performance when their DAF is also diverse. For firms with DAF diversity, that is, 1 standard de-
viation below the mean, the opposite effect holds. The U-shape is inverted and the slope is more negative than for
firms with average levels of DAF diversity. These effects amount to the moderation effect we predicted in H5 and
H6. The positive U-shape is more pronounced when reliance on codified AMK combines with highly diverse DAFs.
Instead, DAF diversity is more relevant for firms with low levels of reliance on tacit AMK than for high level of tacit-
ness use.
Figure 3. Predictive margins of reliance on AMK on alliance performance by DAF (Models 3 and 4; 95% confidence intervals).
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5. Discussion
This study was meant to contribute to alliance research by suggesting that reliance on AMK does not benefit alliance
performance indefinitely. We hypothesized that reliance on tacit and codified AMK was nonlinearly associated with
alliance performance. Building on and contributing to the knowledge-based view of the firm (Nonaka, 1994; Grant,
1996), we found that the deployment of tacit AMK favors a better understanding of the alliance nuances, and thus
leads to a higher quality of alliance procedures and decisions. Yet, our evidence confirms theory suggesting that tacit
knowledge accumulation is likely to also trigger overconfidence and superstitious learning over a certain threshold
(Zollo, 2009; Heimeriks, 2010). When reliance on experiential learning is high, the risk for firms is that stickiness
becomes the norm, thus limiting knowledge transfer and sharing.
Similarly, results support a positive and significant direct effect of reliance on codified tools to guide alliance man-
agement on alliance performance. The production and update of these tools not only provide practical means to en-
hance decisions and actions over alliance life cycles but also focus managers’ attention on the most critical aspects,
giving them the opportunity to discover the rationale underlying greater alliance performance (Kale et al., 2001).
However, when codification becomes the norm, organizational members might lose sight on surrounding opportuni-
ties or keep reiterate sub-optimal routines.
Figure 4. Predictive margins of reliance on AMK on alliance performance by DAF diversity (Models 5–10; 95% confidence
intervals).
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We discovered that firms with the DAF experience higher alliance performance at both low and high levels of reli-
ance on tacit and codified AMK. The DAF acts as a higher-order capability for stimulating learning and fostering ac-
cumulation of lessons learned in those firms where capabilities to leverage on tacit and codified AMK are still to be
developed (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Moreover, the DAF also counters the potential draw-
backs of excessive reliance on experiential learning and codified artifacts. When the DAF is in place, obstacles to
knowledge circulation can be more easily overcome. In fact, the DAF provides a legitimate place to exchange visible
and rewarded alliance practices. Moreover, being forced to monitor and evaluate alliance metrics along the entire al-
liance life cycle, firms with the DAF are more likely to receive signals faster than those who do not have it, thus tak-
ing timely corrective actions.
Though being beneficial for the deployment of AMK, the DAF might exert a dampening effect on alliance per-
formance, too. This impact is especially evident when the DAF is associated with low to intermediate reliance on
codified AMK. When the capabilities and mechanisms to extract value from AMK have still to be fully developed,
the DAF might create redundancies or discourage managers to rely on experience and trial and error experimenta-
tion. Extending prior research (Kale and Singh, 2007; Niesten and Jolink, 2015), these findings suggest that the bene-
ficial impact of the DAF has to be set into contexts, in that it is also linked to the level of alliance management
capabilities the firm has been able to develop.
Last, we investigated the moderating role of DAF attributes on the curvilinear relationship between reliance on
AMK and alliance performance. We found that the beneficial impact of deploying AMK depends on the level of DAF
diversity. Firms with the most diverse DAF are able to extract more value from low levels of reliance on both types
AMK. Moreover, diverse DAF counters the downside effects of excessive use of experiential learning and
codification.
Educational diversity seems to play the most important role in driving the positive influence of tacit AMK on alli-
ance performance. Thanks to different educational backgrounds, managers are more likely to identify the multiple
nuances of alliance know-how and share them more effectively. Conversely, tenure and functional heterogeneity,
though beneficial, have less pronounced effects on the deployment of tacit AMK. Functionally diverse DAF might
find it harder to develop a common understanding of tasks or, even more importantly, reconcile dissimilar, potential-
ly conflicting points of view. The same complexity could hold for tenure diversity. Since tacit knowledge has a strong
relational content, tenure diversity could reiterate organizational hierarchies, thus creating less fertile environments
(Van Knippenberg et al., 2004; Van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007).
Based on our findings, diversity has a stronger impact on the deployment of codified AMK. Educational diversity
facilitates the identification of the right pieces of information, routines, and tools across the organization when reli-
ance on codification is still low. Tenure diversity improves visibility and internal legitimacy. Working in groups with
members who have different organizational tenures and functional background gives accessibility to non-overlapping
knowledge (Richter et al., 2012). This leads to superior performance at low levels of reliance on codified AMK.
Similarly, diverse educational backgrounds and tenure diversity facilitate the implementation of corrective actions
and update outdated routines or formalized procedures when reliance on codification is high. Instead, functional di-
versity is likely to provide the heterogeneous perspectives necessary to change the course when things goes worse
than expected, as well as discover alliance opportunities. This is especially important when reliance on codification is
already high.
5.1 Implications, limits, and future research
This study has also important implications for practitioners. We first claim the need to invest into and properly configure
multiple mechanisms to develop alliance management capabilities. Any mechanism to develop alliance management cap-
ability has a dark side. Our study gives an answer to the question about the declining effects of the alliance learning proc-
esses (Kale and Singh, 2007). Indeed, we support a curvilinear relationship between reliance on knowledge
accumulation and alliance performance, suggesting that an excessive investment in some mechanisms might overweight
their possible benefits. This negative impact could be countered by monitoring the marginal returns on alliances. When
they turn negative, the creation of the DAF could counter this tendency and rejuvenate AMK base.
Firms in need to enhance their alliance capabilities and enjoy greater overall success certainly need to have organ-
izational structures to manage their alliances. Yet, how to configure them in a proper way is not trivial. The DAF
exerts its positive impact also based on the extent to which AMK systems are developed. Our results give empirical
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hints on how to set priorities for the development of different capability development mechanisms that keep perform-
ance high.
Finally, we tested how different attributes of DAF diversity interact with use of experience and reliance on codi-
fied tools to enhance alliance performance. The moderating role of DAF diversity points out to the benefits of educa-
tional, functional, and tenure attributes in leveraging tacit and codified AMK across the organization. The finding
that firms with high DAF diversity experience higher alliance performance at low and high levels of reliance on AMK
emphasizes the importance of focusing resources on those aspects that are more likely to enhance the role of the DAF
in supporting the development of AMK capabilities.
Although our study provides insightful evidence on the role that different mechanisms to build alliance manage-
ment capabilities have as antecedents of alliance performance, it can be extended in several ways. First, in this study
we considered only higher-order alliance management skills, which are likely to be improved by firm’s alliance learn-
ing processes. However, we did not address the actual firm’s alliance management skills possibly required in the dif-
ferent stages of alliance life cycle. This choice might have hidden some important aspects of AMK, which might lie at
the basis of alliance capability building. Thus, future researchers might attempt to investigate these lower-order skills
and mechanisms through case studies or collecting additional data from a smaller sample of firms. Additionally, we
focused on the firm’s reliance on mechanisms to deploy tacit and codified AMK, rather than on the levels of AMK
per se. We took this decision with the aim of investigating organization-wide alliance capabilities as antecedents of
alliance performance. Future studies could be focused both on more direct measures of alliance knowledge level and
to the interaction between AMK and other types of knowledge a company relies on. This would be extremely helpful
to further investigate the knowledge-based antecedents of specific types of alliances, such as, for example,
technology-based alliances or R&D agreements.
Furthermore, like in most of the survey-based researches, we deployed only a perceptual measure of alliance per-
formance provided by the same respondents, adopting a cross-sectional design. Although we demonstrated the un-
likely presence of a common method bias, this choice has probably limited the robustness of the results and provided
only a one-sided perspective of alliance success. Indeed, the deployment of only subjective measures might have led
to the overestimation of alliance performance because managers can have potentially provided biased responses to be
more socially desirable, lenient, and acquiescent. Therefore, in the future, additional analyses might be conducted
through more objective alliance performance measures, such as financial or accounting indicators, considering alli-
ance performance for each company in a specific point in time. Having a longitudinal perspective, future studies
might be able to explain better the evolution of alliance capabilities over time, comparing performance and learning
mechanisms in different stages of firm and alliance maturity.
Though we followed the same procedure as suggested by previous research to draw a sample as representative
as possible (Dyer et al., 2001; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), we ended up with a relatively small sample. Having
access to primary data on alliances is clearly a complex task. This is the reason why samples, in survey-based al-
liance research, are hardly over 200 observations. Future studies could tackle this point, testing our hypotheses
on larger samples or in given industries to maximize the chance to improve sample size and the generalizability
of the findings.
We aimed at predicting alliance performance as a function of alliance management capabilities identified through
reliance on different types of AMK. We acknowledge that it is likely that the decision to invest in the development of
alliance management capability and alliance management structures (i.e., the DAF) might be endogenous and related
to prior performance. However, prior research has demonstrated that a deliberate learning effect is also apparent
when controlling for this (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Though we were not able to directly control for financial
measures of past performance, our results held controlling for firm size, that is, one of the most investigated proxies
to account for slack resources (Kale et al., 2002). We also used a lead of the dependent variable to maximize the
chance to rule out direct simultaneity. Future research should further test whether endogeneity drives the positive re-
sult from reliance on AMK on alliance performance, by conducting instrumental variable regressions.
Finally, we focused on the moderating role of the DAF and DAF diversity on alliance knowledge deployment.
Yet, these functions play other similarly important roles, such has increasing external visibility, organizing internal
coordination, or favoring alliance assessment (Dyer et al., 2001). These aspects are worth of further investigation, in
relation to alliance capability building and alliance performance. This would require a finer grained investigation of
the role of a DAF, rather that its mere presence as an organizational unit within the firm. Similarly, we did not ac-
count for the different organizational position that the DAF could have across companies. Having the DAF at the
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corporate level or alternatively at the business unit level could provide different benefits to the deployment of AMK.
Future studies could collect more detailed data on the different organizational configuration of the DAF and how
they relate both to alliance success and the successful deployment of AMK.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Review of the literature on alliance capability development
Reference Proposals/findings
Simonin (1997) Firms with greater collaborative experience achieve higher levels of collaborative know-how,
increasing the number of tangible and intangible benefits from collaborations
Anand and Khanna
(2000)
Firm-level alliance capability is based on experience. However, experience is not sufficient to explain
heterogeneity in alliance performance
Dyer et al. (2001) Alliance know-how and best practices are built and leveraged within the company through the four
C’s, namely, capture, codify, communicate, and coach
Kale et al. (2002) Experience and investment in a DAF positively influence alliance performance
Zollo et al. (2002) Experience in previous alliances enhances the performance of the focal alliance, especially if this ex-
perience has been collected in the same technological area and with the same partner
Draulans et al. (2003) Inexperienced firms learn from trainings and individual alliance evaluations, while more experienced
firms benefit from an alliance specialist and comparison of alliance evaluations
Hoang and Rothaermel
(2005)
General and partner-specific alliance experience has a positive effect on alliance performance
Sampson (2005) Alliance experience has a positive relationship with alliance performance, but there are decreasing
marginal returns. Prior alliance experience has a greater positive effect when the alliance activities
are more uncertain or complex
Heimeriks and Duysters
(2007)
Alliance capabilities partially mediate between alliance experience and alliance portfolio perform-
ance, indicating firms can improve their performance by dispersing lessons from prior alliances
Heimeriks et al. (2007) Integrating mechanisms, such as trainings and know-sharing activities, have a stronger positive effect
on alliance portfolio performance than institutionalizing mechanisms, especially for firms with lit-
tle alliance experience. Conversely, for firms with extensive alliance experience, institutionalizing
mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on alliance portfolio performance
Kale and Singh (2007) Alliance capabilities are built thanks to a specific learning process based on articulation, codification,
sharing, and internalization
Kale and Singh (2009) Coordinative capacity and knowledge management processes (articulation, codification, sharing,
and internalization) positively influence alliance performance
Heimeriks (2010) Learning mechanisms used to manage alliance portfolios, distinguished between integrating and
institutionalizing mechanisms, nurture competence, but they might also mirror confidence
Schilke and Goerzen
(2010)
There is a positive relationship between alliance management capability and alliance portfolio per-
formance. Alliance management capability is based on coordination, learning, sensing, and trans-
formation and mediates the effect of alliance experience on alliance portfolio performance
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Appendix B
Dependent and independent variables: factor analysis
Alliance performance: survey items and factor analysis—component matrix
Item Component 1
1—Your company alliances are overall successful 0.883
2—Your company is considered a “good partner” by your allies 0.843
3—The relationships between your company and the alliance partners are strong and harmonious 0.842
4—Your company has enhanced its competitive position in its existing businesses through alliances 0.834
5—Your company has not acquired new capabilities and competencies through alliances (reverse) 0.723
6—Your company has entered new businesses or markets through alliances 0.758
Extraction method: principal component analysis (respondents were asked to rate alliance performance by referring to alliances formed between 2012 and 2014,
1 ¼ “Strongly disagree”; 7 ¼ “Strongly agree”).
KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity tests
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.875
Bartlett’s test of sphericity Approx. chi-square 394.626
df 15
Significance 0.000
Tacit knowledge: survey items and factor analysis—component matrix
Item Component 1
1—Company managers rely on prior experience to guide the formation or management of any alliance 0.441
2—Company managers engage in informal alliance-related knowledge-sharing and exchange activities with colleagues 0.789
3—Company managers participate in forums such as task forces or committees where they can collect their alliance
experience and practices
0.783
4—Company managers with substantial prior experience in managing alliances are often rotated across key alliances 0.760
Extraction method: principal component analysis (respondents were asked to refer to alliances formed between 2012 and 2014, 1 ¼ “Strongly disagree”; 7 ¼
“Strongly agree”).
KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity tests
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.645
Bartlett’s test of sphericity Approx. chi-square 71.563
df 6
Significance 0.000
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Codified knowledge: survey items and factor analysis—component matrix
Item Component 1
1—Managers follow a well-defined written process to guide the formation or management of any alliance 0.848
2—Simple resources such as checklists or guidelines are developed and used to assist alliance decision-making and/
or actions
0.831
3—Elaborated resources such as alliance manuals (containing tools, templates, or frameworks) are developed and
used to assist alliance decision-making and/or action
0.921
4—The company updates the alliance checklists, guidelines, or manuals that have been developed and are in use 0.888
Extraction method: principal component analysis (respondents were asked to refer to alliances formed between 2012 and 2014, 1 ¼ “Strongly disagree”; 7 ¼
“Strongly agree”).
Cronbach’s alpha scores
Cronbach’s alpha Cronbach’s alpha based on standardized items Number of items
Alliance performance 0.890 0.898 6
Tacit knowledge 0.705 0.710 3
Codified knowledge 0.895 0.895 4
KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity tests
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.826
Bartlett’s test of sphericity Approx. chi-square 276.136
df 6
Significance 0.000
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